Dear Judge ______________________:
Please accept this letter brief in lieu of a more formal brief in support of my Motion for Declaratory Judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201. 2202; Motion to Deny and Vacate Defendants' Jones and Smith , et al. notice of motion pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6) returnable December 4, 1995 in lieu of Answer to dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim; Motion to Dismiss Attorney General from representing state actors for conflict of interest, violation of Separation of Powers and violation of Checks and Balances.
Plaintiff will show that his Constitutionally protected fundamental, unalienable rights to the father-child relationship were impermissibly and unlawfully interfered with and severely infringed upon by _________________ as well as the other named defendants. Defendants were without right to infringe upon Constitutionally protected rights without a compelling State interest. Plaintiff will show that there was no compelling State interest and all named Defendants have acted in Bad Faith.
In their Statement of the Matter, Defendants Judge Smith and Jones failed to include as part of their motion to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6), the criminal charges brought by Plaintiff against Defendants pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. 4; 18 U.8.C. 2382, 2383; 18 U.S.C. 241, 242, 371.
Defendants MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) IS
WITHOUT BASIS OF FACT OR LAW AND MUST BE denied
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants cannot move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) just by stating that the court assumes that the allegations of the complaint are true.
Plaintiff is not attacking a state court judgment, but is bringing this Federal Civil Rights action for damages and injunctive relief because of the Defendants commissions and omissions. Plaintiff is not raising a constitutional challenge to a state court judgment. He is seeking damages for violations of rights by the named actors in their personal and official capacities because of infringement upon his fundamental rights.
Moreover, Federal Courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over domestic relations disputes, but normally do not adjudicate them. H. @art & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts of @h@ Federal Svstem 1463 (3d ed. 1988@(citations omitted). See Mar@ham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946).
The Third Circuit has rejected the domestic relations abstention doctrine in Section 1983 cases and intentional interference with Parental Custody/Visitation Rights. Di Ruaaiero v. Rodaers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying New Jersey law), Flood v. 8raaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
In Flood v. Braaten, the Third Circuit has frequently implied that the domestic relations exception applies only to diversity jurisdiction. In Flood, the Court stated that it found no case@ relying on the domestic relations exception to deny jurisdiction when a litigant had alleged a well-pleaded and substantial complaint. 727 F.2d 307-08 n. 17.
The Supreme Court of the United States of America in recent years has adjudicated large numbers of constitutional claims in the field of domestic relations. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S.Ct. 2206 (1992), Clark v. Jeter, 108 S.Ct.
1910 (1988); Lehr v. Robert80n, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mill8 v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Santoskv v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Las8iter v. De@t. of Social Service8, 452 U.S. 18; Little v. Streeter, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanlev v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Given these decisions it is hard to conclude that the domestic relations exception extends to all federal questions arising in the family law area and therefore the Federal courts _ have subject matter jurisdiction to hear these cases.
Again, this is a Civil Rights action for damages and injunctive relief, not an action to challenge or overturn a state court decision.
Various courts have held that state law claims alleging wrongful interference with custodial rights do not fall within the dome8tic relations exception. See also, Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1985); Llovd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491-93 (7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wasserman v. Wa88erman, 671 F.2d 832, 834-35 (4th Cir. 1982).
Many of the cases cited herein are post-Feldman and are applicable to the issues in the instant case. Many of the federal circuits are in opposition to Feldman and specifically since this matter is an action for Civil Rights damages, Feldman and/or its progeny does not apply.
See also, Raft-rv v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985) where a noncustodial father was awarded @50,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In McIntvre v. McIntvre, 771 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1985), a noncustodiAl father brought suit against former wife and her relatives for past breaches of visitation rights granted by a state court. The Ninth Circuit held that abstention was improper, as the federal court had jurisdiction over a tort action between former spouses for interference with visitation rights.
Most importantly, Plaintiff in the instant case is not raising issues regarding the divorce or any related matter, because the divorce was largely terminated several years earlier, and the suit concerns not the establishment and implementation of visitation rights, but rather, seeks an award of damages precisely because of acts by the former wife and named Defendants acting in concert with her to frustrate and destroy whatever relationship Plaintiff has left with his daughter .
This Federal Court must take judicial notice of Plaintiff's Constitutionally protected fundamental, unalienable rights regarding his father-child relationship, pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. Rules of Evidence, F.R.F. 201 (a),(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) as well as the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, N.J.R.E. 201 (a-f). Judicial notice is to be taken with regard to this case including but not limited to Constitutional law of the United States and New Jersey State, as well as statutory law and decisional law, rules of court and private legislative acts and resolutions of the United States, New Jersey, and every other state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States as well as ordinances, regulations, and determinations of all governmental subdivisions and agencies thereof.
"Parents possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of their children, and the state's interference with such liberty interest without due process of law is remediable under 42 U.S.C. 8ection 1983." Kel80n v. Citv of SDrinafield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985).
"A noncustodial parent has no other way to implement the constitutionally protected right to maintain a parental relationship with his children except through visitation. To acknowledge the protected status of the relationship and yet deny protection under Section 1983 to visitation, which is the exclusive means of effecting that right, is to negate the r@ght completely". Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1338 (lOth Cir. 1981)
Plaintiff alleges in the instant case that his rights to visitation are constantly violated and thwarted and because of gender bias against men being perpetrated by the family courts of New Jersey, cannot get protection from these same courts with respect to visitation/custody rights enforcement.
"Despite the obvious unfairness of allowing an uncooperative parent to flout a court decree, we are unwilling to sanction punishment of a recalcitrant parent..."
This statement comes from the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the ca-e of Beck y@ Bec@, 86 N.J. 480, 499 (1981). It i8 a foregone conclusion that the N.J. 8upreme Court is gender biased against men in particular when it comes to enforcing their relationship with their children and have been committing this bias since this decision with regularity and with knowledge and forethought. Therefore, the trial court judges who are the subservient tools of the Supreme Court must follow the mandates of the upper court, even if it means violating the rights of men, and specifically Plaintiff in this instant cause.
In New Jersey alone, over 400,000 children (statistics compiled by the Children's Rights Council, Washington, D.C. 1992) are denied access to their fathers, because of malicious and vindictive custodial spouses who know that they have the blessings of New Jersey's highest court to destroy the father-child relationship.
The claims of plaintiff in the instant suit are distinguishable from the position asserted by the defendants regarding Feldman, Connell and Rosauist, in that defendants were and continue to act in "Bad Faith" and have caused plaintiff damages, both financial and physical/emotional and defendants continue to deprive plaintiff of his father-child relationship. Based on the gender bias of the courts in failing to protect a father's right to a relationship with his children and the inherent political correctness against fathers as parents, plaintiff has no adequate remedy in state court to protect his fundamental religious rights of the family relationship. These rights are a protected fundamental religious interest based on the family being the focal point of religion and society.
As such the state has no compelling interest to continue to interfere with plaintiff's religious rights to the care, companionship and nurturing of his child because the state is subservient to plaintiff's and his child's religious rights, belief and teachings in the ways of raising a family and the interaction therefrom.
Defendants Smith and Jones, as well as all other named defendants, are not immune and therefore F.R.CIV.P. 12 (b)(6) cannot be granted as there are numerous facts and laws in dispute.
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT JUDGES NEVER HAD
ABSOLUTE OR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY UNDER COMMON LAW --
DEFENDANTS SMITH AND Jones HAVE NO IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Plaintiff also demands Declaratory Relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202 defining whether or not the named Defendant judges have any immunity at all since they are creatures of the legislative (Senate) appointment and confirmation process in New Jersey, and under the New Jersey Constitution, Article IV, Section VII, Paragraph 9, Clause 8, which in part unequivocally States:
Paragraph 9. Clause 8:
"The Legislature shall not pass any private, special or local laws: (8) Granting to any corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatsoever".
The key issues here are "the Legislature shall not pass any laws granting any individual any immunitv. Therefore, since judges in New Jersey are confirmed by the political process then they fall under the purview of WE THE PEOPLE and are under our will.
"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the people, and they have the right at all times to alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require it." N.J. Const.. Art.I. Parac.2.
Since WE THE PEOPLE were and are represented in Congress and Congress passed the 1866 and 1871 Civil Rights Acts to deprive all state officials any immunity from suit, to date there has never been a modification by Congress or a ratification to change any Constitutional provision, either in the Constitution for the United States of America or New Jersey State Constitution, which ever gave judges or any other state public official any immunities whatsoever.
We now have a constitutional issue, in Plaintiff's instant case, to be decided by the Federal courts because it obviously is a conflict of interest if decided by the state
courts, since these are state judges empowered by the state Legislative process.
The people of New Jersey never gave judges any judicial immunity and it is so stated in the New Jersey Constitution aforementioned.
Defendant judges Smith and Jones attempt to claim immunity as judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. They cite their alleged immunities under common law doctrines that date back to old England and English common law.
Defendant judges cite numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases to support their hypothesis of absolute immunity applies to suits brought under the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 (42 U.S.C. 1983).
Defendants Smith and Jones assert and contend that judges must be free to act upon their own convictions in the proper administration of justice without apprehension of the consequences. They further contend that the immunity is intended to provide judges with maximum ability to act fearlessly and impartially without an atmosphere of intimidation or harassment.
Defendants cite Pierson v. Rav, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) as their source for their absolute immunity. Defendants cite that Pierson states that judges should not be burdened with the fear of litigants "hounding" them with litigation charging malice or corruption
The U S Supreme Court was in major error with regard to the Pierson case and it took it upon itself, as a Super-Legislative body, in an unlawful manner, to reword the meaning of the enact-d Civil Rights law The Supreme Court misconstrued that if Congress had intended to abolish judicial immunity, it would have specifically 80 provided, had it wished to abolish the doctrine of judicial immunity
This Supreme Court, in its continuance of covering up for the unlawful actions of judges, plainly rewrote the laws of this United States, by trying to remove the parts of the Civil Rights Laws that allowed recovery to a person injured by the ruling of a judge acting for personal gain or out of personal motives
This unfounded misinterpretation is nothing more than an illusion and a distortion of the true as spoken meaning of the 42nd Congress in the year 1871. For any Court to change the words and/or meaning of a Congressionally Enacted Statute is beyond the jurisdiction of such a Court, and any such Court findings should be ignored as blatantly unconstitutional. Therefore, no future Court should give credibility to an improper act of a prior Court. Congress makes laws and only Congress can change their enacted laws.
In Pierson, at page 386 U S 562, the following is stated by the Supreme Court in a misleading manner, leaving out key and important words:
"Hitherto...no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts...Under the provisions of [Sectlon 1] every judge in the State court... will enter upon and pursue the call of offlclal duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him..."
The full statement to the above is as follows:
"Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge of court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts, and not the ministerial agents of the law have been covered by the same aegis of exemption. Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability; and the judiciary has always remained in justice and equity, in intellect and learning, in freedom and in courage, far, far uplifted above the turmoils, the passions, and the vicissitudes of parties and partisan creeds, the central orb of the highest civilizations, and the sheet anchor of law and order. But no tribunal is sacred in the eye of existing usurpation, and every character, however excellent, must go down under the baleful progress of despotic power. Under the provisions of this section, every judge in the State court and every other officer thereof, great or small will enter upon and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him by a silken thread, and bent upon him the scowl of unbridled power, the forerunner of the impending wrath, which is gathering itself to burst upon its victims". Globe 42nd Congress, 1st Session, March 31, 1866.
The wording of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was given much time and
effort, along with sufficient learned knowledge and understanding as to
the impact upon the State judicial system and its judges and other officials
along with the input of the Congressional Judiciary Committee. After due
deliberation and with forethought of intention pertaining to the nature
of the bill, the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted by Congress on April
20, 1871. The basic words of "Every Person and
All Persons" were well considered and used to intentionally include any
judge that "knowingly and willfully deprived any person of his Constitutional
Rights under color of law". Congress had sound reason to include
judges, as by experience in the past, it was learned that whenever any
person or group of persons is held above and beyond the laws, those persons
abuse the laws to the prejudice of the people of the nation.
None of the four policy issues applies to judges anymore because:
(1) State court judges are on a rotating basis and cannot bring a case to finality in New Jersey and in this instant case Plaintiff contends that his case has become a proverbial "political football" because he already has had six (6) judges on v. and the case looks far from being over;
(2) there is no judicial independence in New Jersey because judges are political creatures controlled by the Legislature (Senate) and the whim of the political party that puts them in office and are thus affected by special interest groups;
(3) there are few if any sincere or conscientious judges--[i.e.--former judge (convicted of stealing $173,000 from business partners, resigns and gets off with slap on the wrist and gets to keep his pension), former judge (convicted of sexual harassment, gets off with resignation, public pays for suit against him and he gets to keep his pension), former judge (convicted of drug dealing, resigns and gets slap on the wrist and gets to keep pension and allowed to continue practicing law), former judge (berates litigants and is gender biased towards male litigants, is removed from bench for improprieties), other judges are suspected of taking kickbacks from court appointed psychologists they send litigants to in family cases], especially in the instant case they all violated the law just as Defendants aforementioned.
(4)The judiciary and State government have lost all respect from WE THE PEOPLE, as can be evidenced by public hearings against the judiciary and people voting out corrupt, dishonest and lazy politicians by the droves, and by more and more State officials being indicted and convicted for crimes against the people.
Furthermore, during the time of Coke, the Star-Chamber courts came to symbolize the civilized world's greatest denial of basic individual rights. It became so corrupt, oppressive and violative of individual rights that it was abolished. The Star-Chamber embodied swiftness and power, however, it was not a competitor of common law (which the Constitution for the United States of America is based on),so much as a limitation on it (the rights of the people).
The Star-Chamber adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant. In most cases, counsel was politically correct to the Star-Chamber's jurisdiction and rulings, whether right or wrong. The defendant's answer to an indictment was not accepted unless it was signed by counsel.
Because the Star-Chamber was a mixture of judicial and executive power, it specialized in trying "political" cases. Plaintiff's case is identical here again. He is deprived of his right to have a relationship with his child, in violation of his fundamental, unalienable First Amendment rights to associate and freedom of religion. Given the politically correct hysteria surrounding custody and visitation enforcement these days, it has become a hot political topic.
When Plaintiff attempted to assert his right to associate with his child through visitation/custody rights, he has been deprived of that right, castigated for trying to assert his God-given rights and then told he was and is not cooperating-a mind set that is reminiscent of the 1950's and 1960's Stalinist Soviet Union-and would be held in contempt and threatened with a myriad of sanctions, including imprisonment, if he continued to assert his rights. Star-Chamber proceedings are the antithesis of fundamental and basic human rights and as such were abolished in 1641 under the revolutionary government of that time. Yet, today the unlawful Star-Chamber has been resurrected in what is now known as the family court. Based on the aforementioned, the two Defendant judges, being sued by Plaintiff, did exactly what the Star-Chambers did. Defendant Judges Smith and Jones acted without jurisdiction but usurped it anyway, by depriving Plaintiff a father-child relationship without a compelling state interest. Since the Plaintiff filed the 1983 action against Defendant Judges and others, they immediately themselves off of the Plaintiff's state case, pursuant to the New Jersey Court Rules, R.l:lZ-1 (e) and (f), Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 and since all Defendant Judges took an Oath to Uphold and Defend the U.S. Constitution and the Laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. 455 (a) and (b). Based on this, immunity doctrine for judges is an artificial judge-created law/fiction and was never lawfully established by any lawful government through the normal procedures. Based on when the doctrine of judicial immunity was established-during the Star-Chamber era-one has to wonder if immunity is at all lawful. Again, Star-Chamber proceedings were the most corrupt, oppressive and tyrannical form of (in)justice in the history of the world. To establish the doctrine of judicial immunity from this abomination is to say that our present judicial system is the progeny of the Star-Chamber (specifically family courts). If judges have to hide behind this purported judicial immunity, the judicial system of this nation has failed as a system and the citizens of this nation demand total accountability for the judiciary at all times. Therefore, Plaintiff demands total accountability of the two (2) Defendant judges, and demands damages from each of them in their individual capacities. Lastly, to prove Plaintiff's point that there is no judicial immunity and he is entitled to and can collect money damages from the Defendant judges he cites a recent Federal District Court case to support his position. In a case called McPherson v. Kelsey, et al. U.S. District Court case number 5:93-cv-166, state court Judge G. Michael Hocking of Michigan's 56th Circuit Court was sued and lost. Judge Hocking ordered an attorney jailed for contempt when she argued against his unlawful conduct in a custody and visitation matter. The attorney was literally dragged from the courtroom where deputies beat her. She sustained brain damage from the assault. Her client, the father involved in the visitation dispute protested the action. At one point the Judge ran from the Courtroom, instructed his deputies to seize the father, search him at gunpoint and expel him from the courthouse. The father and attorney filed separate 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions. On June 23rd, 1995 Judge Richard A. Enslen of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan entered a directed verdict against Judge Hocking on First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The jury found against Hocking and awarded the attorney and the father money damages. Plaintiff, time and again, has been harassed by the defendant judges to the point of terroristic threats of bodily harm, by having Defendant judges threatening plaintiff with contempt (and intimidation of having Sheriff's officers menace Plaintiff and the threat of physical incarceration) for asserting his fundamental rights in the courtroom.
POINT III DEFENDANTS Smith and Jones violated THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL OATHS TO UPHOLD AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CONSTITUTION FOR NEW JERSEY BY DENYING PLAINTIFF HIS FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Defendant judges took an Oath to Uphold and Defend the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of New Jersey State, pursuant to 4 U.S.C. 101 and 102 and N.J.S.A. 41:1-1 and 41:2A-6. Plaintiff, being WE THE PEOPLE, asserts and maintains that the aforementioned denials of effective assistance of counsel, failure to enforce visitation laws that are on the books and are clearly established law, failure to provide Due Process to plaintiff, amounts to defendants failing to perform their duties under the Oaths that they took. Those Oaths specifically were employed to protect the people and as a result of the Defendant Judges' actions, commissions and/or omissions, violated Plaintiff ' s fundamental rights, when they violated their own Oaths. "We [Courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would the Constitution. _ _ _ _ _ _ Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). See also, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, Further To the Plaintiff being denied his basic fundamental rights to substantive as well as procedural due process and equal protection under the laws, starting with denial of effective assistance of counsel and being forced/coerced into not having a relationship with his child, is in violation of the N.J. Criminal Statutes for Visitation/Custody interference, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4a), Contempt of Court orders, 2C:29-9(a) and having the child being criminally restrained by the former wife, aided and abetted by the defendant judges , in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2 and 2C:13-3. Defendant , by violating Plaintiff 's Substantive and fundamental rights, are in violation of 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242 and 371, by aiding and abetting Plaintiff's former wife and her attorney in depriving the minor child and the Plaintiff of a Constitutionally protected, substantive, fundamental right and violating Plaintiff's religious beliefs and training. These criminal actions by the two state judge actors give rise to further federal criminal acts under 18 U.S.C. 4, 18 U.S.C. 2382 and 2383. The Defendant judges in this instant case caused and allowed criminal behavior which deprived Plaintiff of all of his rights, and caused his child to be deprived of all of her rights and interfered with a sacred religious relationship between father and child. The use of coercive methods, to obtain a coerced or forced judgment against Plaintiff to deprive him of his rights to a father-child relationship, where no crime existed, a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983. GraY v. Sdillman, 925 F.2d 90 t4th Cir. 1991); Rex v. Teeles, 753 F.2d 840 (lOth Cir. 1985); Duncan v. Nelon, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972). When a judge exceeds his jurisdiction and grants or denies that beyond his lawful authority to grant or deny, he has perpetrated a non-judicial' action. Yates v. Hoï¿½fman Estates, 209 F.Supp. 757 Ill. D.C. 1962. As long as the Defendants who abridge Plaintiff's constitutional rights act pursuant to a statute or local law which empowers them to commit the wrongful acts, an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is established. Laverne v. Corning, 316 F. Supp. 629 (D.C. N.Y. 1970). Since the judicial Defendants in Plaintiff's instant case always contended that they were acting under State law, they became state actors. Defendants Smith and Jones are being sued for violating Plaintiff 's fundamentally protected unalienable substantive rights, in their individual 22 capacities, and Eleventh Amendment protections do not apply to named Defendants, even though their actions can only be effected through their official positions. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). If this is the case, then Plaintiff has been unlawfully denied and deprived of his child, for over two years, for no reason. Therefore, based on the aforementioned Plaintiff has a number of fact and law issues that must be put before a jury. Defendants are therefore guilty of violating Plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242. Plaintiff demands damages from the Defendant Judges on the basis of their criminal actions and demands that they also be charged and indicted for their crimes against humanity. "To assume that Congress, which had enacted a criminal sanction directed against state judicial officials, intended sub silentio to exempt those same officials from the civil counterpart approaches the incredible." Tsee, Xates, Immunity of State Judges under the Federal Civil Rights Acts, 65 Nw.U.L. Rev. 615, 622-23 (1970). Briscoe v. LaHue, at 1130. The vested right to act as a judge who has sworn to an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution and adjudicate all matters fairly and to act "under color of law", does not grant a judge to act as an "outlaw". Defendants leave out an important aspect to the accountability of judges in New Jersey. They are politically 23 appointed creatures. The doctrine of absolute immunity is improperly situated when it allows judges to render decisions without fear of consequences, especially since judges are legislative, political creatures in New Jersey, who are influenced by the political party to which they honor and to the special interest groups that may affect that political party. In citing the Pierson decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, defendants try to persuade that a judge who errs, or acts maliciously or corruptly can be corrected in appeal. Given the costs of appeal in this country, only the very rich can afford that luxury. The majority of Us have to, but cannot, live with improper, erroneous, malicious, corrupt- ridden and biased orders of judges that have no bearing on the law or equity, but are based on a particular judge or judges' personal prejudices. Furthermore, all of the New Jersey judges in positions of review are political creatures as well and are basically above the law and allow personal prejudices to permeate the system. "When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts no longer as a judge, but a minister' of his own prejudice". Pierson v. RaY, 386 U.S. @47, 567 (1967@. Further, judges are supposed to be the "supreme law givers" and are a judge need to be appealed if he is "all-knowing"? That is 24 "all-knowing" regarding the 1 fallacy in the Pierson ruling. And that is why judges have to be held to the highest accountability of all state actors. Judges who violate the Constitutions and laws of the United States of America and New Jersey lose all immunity from civil suit as well as criminal action. In the instant case, Defendant Judges had and continue to have no right and no compelling state interest, unless in cases of criminal child abuse, to interfere with Plaintiff religious rights to raise his child/family and rights to association and privacy in the care, companionship and nurturing of his child.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY CANNOT DEFEND STATE JUDGE DEFENDANTS/ACTORS BECAUSE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The effective control by members of one group-the legal profession-of all government violates the principles of our republican form of representative government and separation of powers of the Constitution for the United States of America, Article IV, Section 4. The constitutional rights of the people to representative government free from single A Interest "same hands" control, supersedes the rights of the Members of any single profession to collectively acquire that Control.
"...the accumulation of all powers...in the same hands..., may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny". Federalist 51, James Madison (17873. No group can share a single "same hands" interest different from the interests of the general population, because a single "same hands" group is a special interest group intent on protecting itself and its interests Since the legal profession has entirely taken over one of three branches of government-the judiciary-without public input (even though the U.S. Constitution does not require it), it is certainly fair and reasonable to require that their representation be limited to the judiciary only. The office of the attorney general, by representing the Defendants/judicial officers, is in serious conflict of interest because the Office of the Attorney General is part of the Executive Branch of Government under the 1947 New Jersey State Constitution Article V, Section IV Paragraph 1. As such, two (2) branches of government are being used against Plaintiff to defend members of the Judiciary. This Is a blatant violation of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances of both the Constitution for the United States of America and New Jersey State Constitution. Further violation of Plaintiff Due Process and Equal Protection rights to at least have a fair chance to his government for grievances under Amendment I of the 26
Constitution for the United States of America. And it reeks of conspiracy and aiding and abetting members of the same profession.
In this context the attempt by the Attorney General's office acting in the capacity as private attorneys for Defendant Judges Smith and Jones is a serious and unlawful conflict of interest and violation of Separation of Powers/Checks and Balances. This then tends to cover Defendant Judicial officers with an artificial/fictious cloak of protection known as immunity which, as described above, has no logical or lawful validity.
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully requested that Plaintiff's Motion for Declaratory Judgment Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202 i8 GRANTED because of facts and law in dispute; And Plaintiff's Motion to Deny and Vacate Defendants' Motion be GRANTED because this Court has subject matter jurisdiction and Defendants have no immunity from suit and are criminally liable; And Plaintiff's Motion to Motion to Dismiss Attorney General from Representing State Actors for Conflict of Interest and Violation of Separation of Powers; It is respectfully requested that Defendants' Hon.(Etc to dismiss DAG's motion