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Fathers' Rights Case Law

Constitutional Protection of Fatherhood

FATHERS' MANIFESTO Home Page

Fathers' Rights Case Law

Fathers' Rights Case Law Title 42 USC 1983 is for (federal) civil rights violations. "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409; 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976) [The fact that There are federal rules\laws regarding suing including judges for violations of constitutional rights is proof enough that it occurs.] [Often instead of coming right out with it phrases like "an error of law" are used, not that the law is in error, but that the judge's ruling\ order or decision is "in error of the law". This means the judge's ruling is contrary to or in opposition to the law. Note the law may be "case law".]

THE LAW -federal cases- 2 1. Right of parents to the care, custody and to nurture their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principals of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political instuitutions, AND SUCH RIGHT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY THIS AMENDMENT AND AMENDMENTS 5, 9, and 14. DOE V. iRWIN, 441 f. sUPP. 1247, u.s. dISTRICT cOURT OF mICHIGAN (1977)

2. THE lIBERTY INTEREST AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE FAMILY encompass an interest in RETAINING CUSTODY OF ONE'S CHILDREN and, thus A STATE MAY NOT INTERFERE WITH A PARENT'S CUSTODIAL RIGHT ABSENT DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS. Langton v. Maloney, 527 F.Supp. 538 (U.S. dist. Ct. Connecticut - 1981)

3." courts (must) indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, and... .not presume acquiescence in the loss offundamental rights" Dimick v. Schiedt. 293 U.S. 474 (1935); 304 US at 464

4.Laws and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered "with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates teh Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) [Then ask: did the mother make a motion to hold you in contempt? if so, what for , and what happened. here is some interesting law:] "Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional mandate may not be tolerated, even though such disobedience may not be tolerated, even though such disobedience may. . . . promote in some respects the best interests of the public." Watson v. City of Memphis, 83 S.Ct. 1314, 375 U.S. 526, 10 L.Ed. 2d.(1963)

The pleading of one who pleads pro se for the protection of civil rights should be liberally construed. Blood v. Margis, 322 F.2d 1086 (1971) Amendment 14 "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges of immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS: "Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life; if anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into on going family affairs." Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) Parents have fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of legal bond with their children. Matter of Delaney, 617 P.2d 886, Oklahoma (1980)

Parent's interest in custody of her children is liberty interest which has received considerable constitutional protection; parent who is deprived of custody of his or her child, even though temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due process protection. In Interest of Cooper, 621 P.2d 437, 5 Kansas App. Div. 2d 584 (1980)

"Father enjoys the right to associate with his children which is guaranteed by this amendment (1st) as incorporated in Amendment 14, or which is embodied in the concept of 'liberty' as that word is used in the due process clause of 14th Amendment and equal protection clause of 14th." Mabra v. schmidt. 356 F.Supp. 620 (U.S. District Ct. Wisconsin 1973)

The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right. Mav v. Anderson. 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843 (1952) that the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected liberty interest (see Declaration of Independence --- life, liberty and pursuit of happiness and 14th Amendment of U.S. Constitution --- No state can deprive any person of life. liberty or property without due process of law nor deny any person the equal protection of the laws). Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F.2d. 651 (U.S. Ct. App. 9th Circuit 1985)

The parent-child relationship is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-45 (S.C. Ct. App 7th Circuit 1985)

"No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child." Carsen v. Elrod, 411 F.Supp. 645, 649 (U.S. District Court Eastern Dist. Virginia 1976)

"A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship deprives form the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult." (Emphasis added) Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 595-599 (U.S. Ct. App. D.C. Circuit 1983)

A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Matter of Gentry, 369 N.W.2d. 889, Mich. Appellate Div. (1983) Legislative classifications which distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special protection; thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination against women must be carefully tailored. The state cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. Orr v. Orr, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)

The United States Supreme Court held that the "old notion" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials, " can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. "No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas." Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7. 10; 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1376 (1975) Classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Craig v. Boren, 97 S.Ct. 451;429 U.S. 190 (1976)

Classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage or national origin are inherently suspect and must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. . . .Any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated and therefore involves the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution. Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S.Ct. 1746; 411 U.S. 677 (1973)

A classification must reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of differences having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Johnson v. Robinson, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 415 U.S. 361 (1974_

While a state has broad power when it comes to making classifications, it may not draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class. Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)

"The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime." Miller v. United States, 230 F. 486 at 489

"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 389 (1968)

Government may not prohibit or control the conduct of a person for reasons that infringe upon constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. Smith v. United State, 502, F.2d.512 (1974

An individual may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory constitutional right. U.S. v. Goodwin, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 457 U.S. 368, 73 L.Ed2d 74, on remand 687 F.2d 44 (1982)

Within limits of practicability, a state must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard. . .Whenever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend. . .The right to meaningful opportunity to be heard within limits of practicality must be protected against denial by particular laws that operate to jeopardize it for particular individuals. Boddie v. Connecticut, 92, S.Ct. 780, 401 U.S. 371. 28 L.Ed.2d 113 conformed t 329 F. Supp. 844 (1971)

Quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law impinges on a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution it is presumptively unconstitutional. Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 448 U.S. 297, 65 L.Ed.2d 784,rehearing denied 101 S.Ct. 39, 448 U.S. 917, 65 L.Ed.2d 1180 (1980)

If a law has no other purpose that to chill assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, it is patently unconstitutional. Harris v. McRae, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 448 U.S. 297, 65 L/Ed.2d 784, rehearing denied 101 S.Ct. 39, 448 U.S. 917, 65 L.Ed2d. 1180 (1980)

In pursuing substantial state interest, state cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity. Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.Ct. 995, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)

Only where state action impinges on exercise of fundamental constitutional right or liberties must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)

"Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of the child as parens patriae and not as adversary,. . . ." Kent v. United States, 86 S.Ct.1045 at 1054 (1966) Where certain fundamental rights are involved, regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest and the legislative enactment must be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state interests at stake. Roe v. Wade, 93 S.Ct. 705, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

A state cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels. Bigelow v. Virginia, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 421 U.S. 809 (1975

There is a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 94 S.Ct. 791, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)

Neither Fourteenth amendment nor Bill of Rights is for adults alone. Application of Gault, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

Vague laws offend several important values; first, vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning; second, vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application; and third, where a vague statute abuts on sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)

A parent may bring a suit against a municipality which failed to provide protection against an ex-spouse, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The parent may recover damages for her son's death and her own injuries, where the police force assured her of protection from a violent ex-spouse. Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, No. 89-7693, U.S. Dist. Ct. --N.Y., April 27, 1990 Police officer loses qualified immunity to claim that facially neutral policy has been executed in a discriminatory manner in a domestic violence situation if that police officer knows that the policy has a discriminatory impact. Hansen v. City of ) Legal Dept., 864 F.2d 1026, 3rd Cir. (1988)

"Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta (1215) was a guarantee that the government would take neither life, liberty, nor property without a trial in accord with the law of the land that already existed at the time the alleged offense was committed." This means that the Due Process Clause gives all Americans, whoever they are and wherever they happen to be, the right to be tried by independent and unprejudiced courts using established procedures and applying valid pre-existing laws. There is not one word of legal history that justifies making the term "due process of law" mean a guarantee of a trial free from laws and conduct which the courts deem at the time to be "arbitrary", "unreasonable", "unfair", or "contrary to civilized standards.". The due process of law standard for a trial is one in accordance with the Bill of Rights and laws passed pursuant to constitutional power, guaranteeing to all alike a trial under the general law of the land. Duncan v. Louisana, 391 U.S. 145; 88 S.Ct. 1444 (1968)

Jury trials are a must when holding a trial for civil contempt where "clear and convincing" evidence must be produced. United States Constitution, Amendment VII states: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollar, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." "The jury. . . . acts not only as a safeguard against judicial excesses, but also as a barrier to legislative and executive oppression. The Supreme Court . . .recognizes that the jury . . . is designed to protect Defendants against oppressive governmental practices." United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955)

The Jury has "an unreviewable and power. . . to acquit in disregard of the instructions on the law given by the trial judge." U.S. v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1139 (1972)

"The common law right of the jury to determine the law as well as the facts remains unimpaired." State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14, 54 AM DEC 90 (1849) "Trial by jury is available . . . as indicated in Seventh Amendment." Pernell v. Southhall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 40 L.Ed 2d 198, 94 S. Ct. (1973)

"Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Brown. 381 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946)

Alexander Hamilton wrote: "Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disqualification, disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The dangerous consequences of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disfranchise any number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions. "The Constitution outlaws this entire category of punitive measures. The amount of punishment is material to the classification of a challenged statute. But punishment is prerequisite. . ." U.S. v. Lovett, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1083 (1946)

"The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining the fact. " U.S. v. Lovett, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1083, (1946)

The singling out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punishment constitutes a "bill of attainder" whether individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct which, because of its past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons. Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 81 S.Ct. 1357, 367 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed.2d 625, rehearing denied 82 S. Ct. 20, 368 U.S. 871, 7 L.Ed.2d 72

UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983 Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1985 (3) If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for the purpose of depriving. any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . . RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE CONSPIRATORS N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1986 Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs . . . are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . . . EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988 "When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the Constitution, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey it." State v. Sutton, 63 Minn. 147 65 NW 262 30 ALR 660. Also see (Watson v. Memphis, 375 US 526; 10 L Ed 529; 83 S.Ct. 1314)

It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS of the citizen, against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v. U.S., 116 US 616, 635, (1885)

" The judicial branch has only one duty --- to lay the article of the Constitution which is involved beside the statue which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. . .the only power it (the Court) has. . .is the power of judgement." U.S. v. Butler, 297 US (1936)

"Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409; 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976)

Title 18 U.S.C.A. 242 (U.S. Criminal Code): "Whoever, under color of law, statute, or ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitants of any state to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or Law of the United States. . . shall be fined no more than $1,000 or imprisoned one year or both."

Title 18 U.S.C.A. 241, 242 are the criminal equivalent of Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985 et seq. "Judges have no immunity from prosecution for their judicial acts." Bradley v. Fisher, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871

"Federal Courts should avoid a ruling that any act of Congress is void on it face if the act can be either construed as constitutional or applied as constitutional." Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F.Supp. 873 (U.S. District Ct. of Montana -1977)

"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgement; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice." Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547 at 567 (1967)

"We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in fact guilty of using his power to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581.

"Government immunity violates the common law maxim that everyone shall have remedy for an injury done to his person or property." Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Washburn County, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 (1957) Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility, while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people." Rabon v. Rowen Memorial Hosp., Inc. 269 NSI. 13, 152 S.E.2d 485, 493 (`1967)

"Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in excess of authority can be actions under 'color of law'. " Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (U.S. Ct. App 10th Circ. - 1963

"A judge is not immune from criminal sanctions under the civil rights act." Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)

"State officials acting in their official capacities, even if in abuse of their lawful authority , generally are held to act "under color" of law. This is because such officials are " clothed with the authority" of state law, which gives them power to perpetrate the very wrongs that Congress intended Section 1983 to prevent. " Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347

"The language and purpose of the civil rights acts, are inconsistent with the application of common law notions of official immunity. . . " Jacobsen v. Henne, 335 F.2d 129, 133 (U.S. Ct. App. 2nd Circ. - 1966) Also see" Anderson v. Nosser, 428 F.2d 183 (U.S. Ct. App. 5th Circ. - 1971)

"Governmental immunity is not a defense under (42 USC 1983) making liable every person who under color of state law deprives another person of his civil rights." Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F.Supp. 95 (District Ct.- of Maine - 1970 "Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction." Bradley v. Fisher, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)

As long as a defendant who abridges a plaintiff's constitutional rights acts pursuant to a statute of local law which empowers him to commit the wrongful act, an action under the Federal Civil Rights statute is established. 42 U.S.C.A. 1981 et seq.; Laverne v. Corning, 316 F.Supp. 629

"The Supreme Court initially discussed judicial immunity in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). In Randall, the Court wrote that judges of superior or general jurisdiction courts were not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts, where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." [Editor's Note: In more recent cases: Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 it was found that judges were really not acting in a malicious and corrupt manner and the proofs also showed that. Congress by its words and meaning enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and that meaning included judges to be held responsible to an injured plaintiff for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any judge made case finding to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional and unlawful. No Court has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and therefore said Congressionally enacted legislation stands as law. The only way to change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No judge can change it and any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in Federal Courts as lawful. No changes in the wording have ever been made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and therefore these Congressionally enacted laws are enforceable in the Federal Courts. The only change made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 took place in 1979. At this time the words "or the District of Columbia" were inserted following "Territory". If any judges or persons representing judges had wanted to make a change this would have been an opportune time to do so. No action was ever taken to change the wording of the law and it remains as such today.]

"The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative. In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 506, 98 S.Ct. 2910 (1978)

Editor's Note: Federal lawsuits can be brought under both Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988 and/or brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials. Butz at 504

"Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity (Ed. Note: or "good faith") would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. . ." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 at 2737, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)

"I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, imposing liability when a public-official defendant "knew or should have known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. This standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been expected" to know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crimes. I, also agree that this standard applies "across the board," to all "government officials performing discretionary functions.," Harlow at 2739, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmum concurring. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting:

"I do not think that all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous their conduct are immune from suit under 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The Court's ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common -law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions." at 558-559

"The position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every member of Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said and that judges would be liable." at 561

"Yet despite the repeated fears of its opponents, and the explicit recognition that the section would subject judges to suit, the section remained as it was proposed; it applied to "any person". There was no exception for members of the judiciary. In light of the sharply contested nature of the issue of judicial immunity it would be reasonable to assume that the judiciary would have been expressly exempted from the wide sweep of the section, if Congress had intended such a result." at 563

"We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good." at 564 ". . .the judge who knowingly turns a trial into a "Kangaroo" court? Or one who intentionally flouts the Constitution in order to obtain conviction? Congress, I think, concluded that the evils of allowing intentional, knowing deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far out weighed the speculative inhibiting effects which might attend an inquiry into a judicial deprivation of civil rights." at 567

"Judges are not immune for their nonjudicial activities, i.e., activities which are ministerial or administrative in nature." Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.Supp. 136

"It is not a judicial function for judge to commit intentional tort, even though tort occurs in courthouse." Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757

"There was no judicial immunity to civil actions for equitable relief under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 Shore v. Howard. 414 F.Supp. 379 "There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability". Id. "Repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights is serious judicial misconduct." Matter of Peeves, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 463.

"When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction or acts in face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost." Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844.

[Editor's Note: If the Right to Counsel under the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the Court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. Remember this in child support contempt proceedings and false domestic violence proceedings.]

"Judges are not absolutely immune from liability to damages under Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 & 1985 Peterson v Stanczak, 48 F.R.D. 426

"Under the common law of England, where individual rights were preserved by a fundamental document such as the Magna Carta, violations of those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional action for damages; violation of constitutional right was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to a trespass action. Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 479 a.2d. 921

"There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability." Shore v. Howard, 414 F.Supp. 379

"State judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights." Goss v. State of Illinois, 312 F2d. 1279 (U.S.Ct.App. - Illinois - 1963)

"Conduct of trial judge must be measured by standard of fairness and impartiality." Greener v. Green, 460 F.2d 1279 (U.S.Ct. App. - Pa. - 1972)

"Judge must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality." 28 U.S.C.A. 144 Pfizer Inc. Lord 456 F.2d 532, cert. denied 92 S.Ct. 2411, 406 U.S. 976 ( U.S. Ct. app - Minn. - 1972)

"A judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost." Id.

[Editor's Note: It is well settled that non-custodial fathers as well as mothers have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in their parent/child relationship and case law as well as statutory law has time and again upheld that right. Judges have complete knowledge of the right of children to have access to both parents during separation and after divorce. For a judge to discriminate on the basis of sex to deny the parent/child relationship or severely limit it without just cause/clear and convincing evidence, causes that judge to lose jurisdiction and therefore judicial immunity because of his discriminatory "ministerial" personal viewpoints.]

"Law requires not only impartial tribunal, but that tribunal appears to be impartial." 28 U.S.C.A. 455. In Re Tip-PaHands Enterprises, Inc., 27 B.R. 780 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.)

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Modified Saturday, October 05, 2013

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