UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983
UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983.
Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom,
or by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. EVERY PERSON
SHALL BE LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY
ANY ACT OF CONGRESS.
UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1985
If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for the purpose of depriving. .
.any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . . RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE CONSPIRATORS, N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY
ANY ACT OF CONGRESS.
UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1986.
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs . . . are about
to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the
commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . .
. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES. NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY
ACT OF CONGRESS.
UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988
"When any court violates the clean and unambiguous language of the
Constitution, a fraud is perpetrated and no one is bound to obey it." State v.
Sutton, 63 Minn. 147 65 NW 262 30 ALR 660. Also see (Watson v. Memphis, 375 US
526; 10 L Ed 529; 83 S.Ct. 1314)
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT JUDGES NEVER HAD ABSOLUTE OR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
UNDER COMMON LAW -- DEFENDANTS HAVE NO IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
Plaintiffs also demand Declaratory Relief under 28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202
defining whether or not the named Defendants have any immunity at all since
they are creatures of the legislative (Senate) appointment and confirmation
process. Since judges are confirmed by the political process then they fall
under the purview of WE THE PEOPLE and are under our will. WE THE PEOPLE were
and are represented in Congress. Congress passed the 1866 and 1871 Civil Rights
Acts specifically to deprive all state officials any immunity from suit. To
date there has never been a modification by Congress or a ratification to
change any Constitutional provision, either in the Constitution for the United
States of America or any State Constitutions, which ever gave judges or any
other state public official any immunities whatsoever. We now have a
constitutional issue to be decided by the Federal courts because of the
conflict of interest by the state. State judges are empowered by the state
Legislative process. The people never gave judges any judicial immunity and it
is so stated in the State Constitutions. Defendants have claimed immunity as
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction. They have cited their alleged immunities under common law
doctrines that date back to old England and English common law. Defendants
have cited numerous U.S. Supreme Court cases to support that their hypothesis
of absolute immunity applies to suits brought under the Civil Rights Acts of
1871 (42 U.S.C. 1983). Defendants contend they must be free to act upon their
own convictions in the proper administration of justice without apprehension of
the consequences. They further contend that the immunity is intended to
provide judges with "maximum ability to act fearlessly and impartially without
an atmosphere of intimidation or harassment." Defendants have cited Pierson v.
Rav, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) as their source for their absolute immunity.
Defendants have cited that Pierson states that judges should not be burdened
with the fear of litigants "hounding" them with litigation charging malice or
The U S Supreme Court was in major error with regard to the Pierson case
and it took it upon itself, as a Super-Legislative body, in an unlawful
manner, to reword the meaning of the enacted Civil Rights law The Supreme
Court misconstrued that if Congress had intended to abolish judicial immunity,
it would have specifically so provided, had it wished to abolish the doctrine
of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court, in its continuance of covering up for
the unlawful actions of judges, plainly rewrote the laws of this United States
by trying to remove the parts of the Civil Rights Laws that allowed recovery to
a person injured by the ruling of a judge acting for personal gain or out of
This unfounded misinterpretation is nothing more than an illusion and a
distortion of the true spoken meaning of the 42nd Congress in the year 1871.
For any Court to change the words or meaning of a Congressionally Enacted
Statute is beyond the jurisdiction of such a Court, and any such Court findings
should be ignored as blatantly unconstitutional. Therefore, no future Court
should give credibility to an improper act of a prior Court. Congress makes
laws and only Congress can change their enacted laws.
In Pierson, at page 386 U S 562, the following is stated by the Supreme
Court in a misleading manner, leaving out key and important words:
"Hitherto...no judge or court has been held liable, civilly or criminally,
for judicial acts...Under the provisions of [Sectlon 1] every judge in the
State court... will enter upon and pursue the call of offlclal duty with the
sword of Damocles suspended over him..."
The full statement to the above is as follows:
"Hitherto, in all the history of this country and of England, no judge of
court has been held liable, civilly or criminally, for judicial acts, and not
the ministerial agents of the law have been covered by the same aegis of
exemption. Willfulness and corruption in error alone created a liability; and
the judiciary has always remained in justice and equity, in intellect and
learning, in freedom and in courage, far, far uplifted above the turmoils, the
passions, and the vicissitudes of parties and partisan creeds, the central orb
of the highest civilizations, and the sheet anchor of law and order. But no
tribunal is sacred in the eye of existing usurpation, and every character,
however excellent, must go down under the baleful progress of despotic power.
Under the provisions of this section, every judge in the State court and every
other officer thereof, great or small will enter upon and pursue the call of
official duty with the sword of Damocles suspended over him by a silken thread,
and bent upon him the scowl of unbridled power, the forerunner of the impending
wrath, which is gathering itself to burst upon its victims". Globe 42nd
Congress, 1st Session.March 31, 1866.
The wording of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was given much time and effort,
along with sufficient learned knowledge and understanding as to the impact upon
the State judicial system and its judges and other officials along with the
input of the Congressional Judiciary Committee. After due deliberation and
with forethought of intention pertaining to the nature of the bill, the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was enacted by Congress on April 20, 1871. The basic words
of "Every Person and All Persons" were well considered and used to
intentionally include any judge that "knowingly and willfully deprived any
person of his Constitutional Rights under color of law". Congress had sound
reason to include judges, as by experience in the past it was learned that
whenever any person or group of persons is held above and beyond the laws,
those persons abuse the laws to the prejudice of the people of the
"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
constitutional rights he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he
acts no longer as a judge, but as a 'minister' of his own prejudices". Pierson
v. Rav, 386 U.S. 547, 567.
The 42nd congress in 1871 knew precisely that judges had openly deprived
persons of this nation of their Constitutional Rights, and therefore, Congress
knowing that State Judiciaries did and would continue depriving Rights,
provided the words "Every Person" in the Act, so that anyone suffering
deprivations of rights had redress in the Federal Courts. The understanding
and meaning of the 1871 Civil Rights Act could not have been made more
1. "The liability of state judicial officials and all official participants
in State judicial proceedings under Section 2 [of the Civil Rights Act of 1871]
was explicitly and repeatedly affirmed. The notion of immunity for such
officials was thoroughly discredited. The Senate sponsor of the Act deemed the
idea akin to the maxim of the English law that the King can do no wrong'. It
places officials above the law. It is the very doctrine out of which the
rebellion [the Civil War] was hatched". Congressional Globe, 39th Congress.
1st Sess., 1758 (1866) Sen. Trumbull).
2. Thus, Section 2 was "aimed directly at the State judiciary". Briscoe v.
LaHue, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1155 (1983).
3. See also, Congressional Globe. 39th Conq.. l-t 8e-s. at 1778 (Sen.
Johnson): section 2 of the 1866 Act "strikes at the judicial department of the
governments of the States".
4. Also, as a Member of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative
Lawrence declared: "I answer it is better to invade the judicial power of the
State than permit it to invade, strike down, and destroy the civil rights of
citizens. A judicial power perverted to such uses should be speedily invaded.
The grievance would be insignificant". in Brigco v. LaHue, at 1128.
Plaintiffs are unaware that Congress ever abolished the 1866 or 1871 Civil
Rights Acts, or has ever amended it. Moreover, judicial immunity evolved in
England and in the early 17th Century Sir Edward Coke in Flovd and Barker, 77
Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607) and The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng.
Rep. 1027 (Star Chamber 1612), laid the foundation for the doctrine of judicial
immunity. Coke established requirements for its application, restricting
immunity to judicial acts made within the judge's jurisdiction. In addition,
he set forth a policy underlying the doctrine:
(1) insuring the finality of judgment;
(2) protecting judicial independence;
(3) avoiding continuous attacks on sincere and conscientious judges; and
(4) maintaining respect for the judiciary and the government.
None of the four policy issues applies to judges anymore because:
(1) State court judges are on a rotating basis and cannot bring a case to
finality and Plaintiffs contend that their cases have become proverbial
"political footballs" as a result, and their cases look far from being
(2) there is no judicial independence because judges are political
creatures controlled by the Legislature (Senate) and the whim of the political
party that puts them in office and are thus affected by special interest
(3) there are few if any sincere or conscientious judges.
(4)The judiciary and State government have lost all respect from WE THE
Furthermore, during the time of Coke, the Star-Chamber courts came to
symbolize the civilized world's greatest denial of basic individual rights.
It became so corrupt, oppressive and violative of individual rights that it was
abolished. The Star-Chamber embodied swiftness and power, however, it was not
a competitor of common law which the Constitution for the United States of
America is based on, so much as a limitation on the rights of the people. The
Star-Chamber adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant.
In most cases, counsel was politically correct to the Star-Chamber's
jurisdiction and rulings, whether right or wrong. The defendant's answer to an
indictment was not accepted unless it was signed by counsel.
Because the Star-Chamber was a mixture of judicial and executive power, it
specialized in trying "political" cases. Plaintiffs' case is identical. They
are deprived of their right to a relationship with their biological children,
in violation of fundamental, unalienable First Amendment rights to associate
and freedom of religion. Given the politically correct hysteria surrounding
custody and visitation enforcement, political agends have taken precedence over
When Plaintiffs attempted to assert their rights to associate with their
children, they were deprived of that right, castigated for trying to assert
God-given rights, and then told they were and are not cooperating, a mind set
that is reminiscent of the 1950's and 1960's Stalinist Soviet Union. They are
held in contempt and threatened with a myriad of sanctions, including
imprisonment, if asserting these rights continued. Star-Chamber proceedings
are the antithesis of fundamental and basic human rights and as such were
abolished in 1641 under the revolutionary government of that time. Today, the
unlawful Star-Chamber has been resurrected by the Family Law Act. Defendants,
being sued by Plaintiffs, did exactly what the Star-Chambers did -- acted
without jurisdiction but usurped it anyway, by depriving Plaintiffs of a
father-child relationship without a compelling state interest.
Defendants took an Oath to Uphold and Defend the U.S. Constitution and the
Laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. 455 (a) and (b). Based on this, immunity
doctrine for judges is an artificial judge-created law/fiction and was never
lawfully established by any lawful government through the normal procedures.
Based on when the doctrine of judicial immunity was established-during the
Star-Chamber era-one has to wonder if immunity is at all lawful. Again,
Star-Chamber proceedings were the most corrupt, oppressive and tyrannical form
of (in)justice in the history of the world. To establish the doctrine of
judicial immunity from this abomination is to say that our present judicial
system is the progeny of the Star-Chamber (specifically the Family Law Act).
If Defendants have to hide behind this purported judicial immunity, the
judicial system of this nation has failed as a system and the citizens of this
nation demand total accountability for the judiciary at all times. Therefore,
Plaintiffs demand total accountability by the Defendants, and demand damages
from each of them in their individual capacities.
There is no judicial immunity and Plaintiffs are entitled to and can
collect money damages from the Defendants, per a recent Federal District Court
case McPherson v. Kelsey, et al. U.S. District Court case number
State court Judge G. Michael Hocking of Michigan's 56th Circuit Court was
sued and lost. Judge Hocking ordered an attorney jailed for contempt when she
argued against his unlawful conduct in a custody and visitation matter. The
attorney was literally dragged from the courtroom where deputies beat her. She
sustained brain damage from the assault. Her client, the father involved in
the visitation dispute protested the action. At one point the Judge ran from
the Courtroom, instructed his deputies to seize the father, search him at
gunpoint and expel him from the courthouse. The father and attorney filed
separate 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions. On June 23rd, 1995 Judge Richard A. Enslen
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan entered a
directed verdict against Judge Hocking on First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims. The jury found against Hocking and awarded the attorney and
the father money damages.
Plaintiffs, time and again, have been harassed by the Defendants to the
point of terroristic threats of bodily harm, by having Defendants threatening
Plaintiffs with contempt (and intimidation of having Sheriff's officers menace
Plaintiffs and the threat of physical incarceration) for asserting fundamental
rights in the courtroom.
DEFENDANTS VIOLATED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL OATHS TO UPHOLD AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY DENYING PLAINTIFFS THEIR
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Defendants took an Oath to Uphold and Defend the Constitution of the United
States of pursuant to 4 U.S.C. 101 and 102. Plaintiffs, being WE THE PEOPLE,
assert and maintain that the aforementioned denials of effective assistance of
counsel, failure to enforce existing laws that are on the books and are
clearly established law, failure to provide Due Process to plaintiffs, amounts
to Defendants failing to perform their duties under the Oaths that they took.
Those Oaths specifically were employed to protect the people and as a result of
the Defendants' actions, commissions and/or omissions, violated Plaintiffs'
fundamental rights, when they violated their own Oaths.
"We [Courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other
would [violate] the Constitution. _ _ _ _ _ _ Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264,
5 L.Ed. 257 (1821). See also, U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 66 L.Ed.2d 392,
To the Plaintiffs, being denied basic fundamental rights to substantive as
well as procedural due process and equal protection under the laws, starting
with denial of effective assistance of counsel and being forced/coerced into
not having a relationship with their children, is in violation of the Family
Law Act itself. Violating Plaintiff s' Substantive and fundamental rights is
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242 and 371, by aiding and abetting
Plaintiffs' former wives by depriving the minor children and Plaintiffs of a
Constitutionally protected, substantive, fundamental right, and violating
Plaintiffs' religious beliefs and training. These criminal actions by state
judge actors give rise to further federal criminal acts under 18 U.S.C. 4, 18
U.S.C. 2382 and 2383. The Defendants caused and allowed criminal behavior
which deprived Plaintiffs of all of rights, and caused their children to be
deprived of all of their rights, and interfered with a sacred religious
relationship between father and child.
1. The use of coercive methods, to obtain coerced or forced judgments
against Plaintiffs to deprive them of their rights to father-child
relationships, where no crime existed, a cause of action exists under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983. GraY v. Sdillman, 925 F.2d 90
t4th Cir. 1991); Rex v. Teeles, 753 F.2d 840 (lOth Cir. 1985); Duncan v.
Nelon, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
2. When a judge exceeds his jurisdiction and grants or denies that beyond
his lawful authority to grant or deny, he has perpetrated a non-judicial'
action. Yates v. Hoï¿½fman Estates, 209 F.Supp. 757 Ill. D.C. 1962.
3. As long as the Defendants who abridge Plaintiff's constitutional rights
act pursuant to a statute or local law which empowers them to commit the
wrongful acts, an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is established. Laverne v.
Corning, 316 F. Supp. 629 (D.C. N.Y. 1970).
Since the Defendants have always contended that they were acting under
State law, they became state actors. Defendants are being sued for violating
Plaintiffs' fundamentally protected unalienable substantive rights, in their
individual capacities, and Eleventh Amendment protections do not apply to named
Defendants, even though their actions can only be effected through their
official positions. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991).
Plaintiffs have been unlawfully denied and deprived of their children, for
no reason. Plaintiffs have a number of fact and law issues that must be put
before a jury. Defendants are guilty of violating Plaintiffs' constitutionally
protected rights pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242. Plaintiffs demand damages
from the Defendants on the basis of their criminal actions and demand that they
also be charged and indicted for their crimes against humanity.
"To assume that Congress, which had enacted a criminal sanction directed
against state judicial officials, intended sub silentio to exempt those same
officials from the civil counterpart approaches the incredible." Tsee, Xates,
Immunity of State Judges under the Federal Civil Rights Acts, 65 Nw.U.L. Rev.
615, 622-23 (1970). Briscoe v. LaHue, at 1130.
The vested right to act as a judge who has sworn to an oath to uphold and
defend the Constitution and adjudicate all matters fairly and to act "under
color of law", does not grant a judge to act as an "outlaw". Defendants
leave out an important aspect to the accountability of judges. They are
politically appointed creatures. The doctrine of absolute immunity is
improperly situated when it allows judges to render decisions without fear of
consequences, especially since judges are legislative, political creatures who
are influenced by the political party to which they honor and to the special
interest groups that may affect that political party. In citing the Pierson
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, defendants try to persuade that a judge who
errs, or acts maliciously or corruptly, can be corrected in appeal. Given the
costs of appeal in this country, only the very rich can afford that luxury.
The majority of us have to, but cannot, live with improper, erroneous,
malicious, corrupt-ridden, and biased orders of judges that have no bearing on
the law or equity, but are based on a particular judge or judges' personal
prejudices. Furthermore, all of the judges in positions of review are
political creatures as well and are basically above the law and allow personal
prejudices to permeate the system.
"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he
acts no longer as a judge, but a minister' of his own prejudice". Pierson v.
RaY, 386 U.S. @47, 567 (1967@.
Judges are supposed to be the "supreme law givers", and that is why judges
have to be held to the highest accountability of all state actors. Judges who
violate the Constitutions and laws of the United States of America lose all
immunity from civil suit as well as criminal action. Defendants had and
continue to have no right and no compelling state interest, unless in cases of
criminal child abuse, to interfere with Plaintiffs' religious rights to raise
their children/family and rights to association and privacy in the care,
companionship and nurturing of their children.
Plaintiffs note the fact that there are federal rules\laws regarding suing
judges for violations of constitutional rights, which is proof enough that it
occurs. Plaintiffs further note that phrases like "an error of law" are used
when the law is not in error, but when the judge's ruling\order or decision is
"in error of the law" or of "case law". This effectively obscures the fact
that a judge's ruling is contrary to or in opposition to the law, setting
dangerous and misleading precedents. Plaintiffs further note that the singling
out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punishment constitutes a
"bill of attainder".
1. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS of
the citizen, against any stealthy encroachments thereon." Boyd v. U.S., 116 US
616, 635, (1885)
2. " The judicial branch has only one duty --- to lay the article of the
Constitution which is involved beside the statue which is challenged and to
decide whether the latter squares with the former. . .the only power it (the
Court) has. . .is the power of judgment." U.S. v. Butler, 297 US (1936)
3. "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on
the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. and 242." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409; 96
S.Ct. 984 (1976)
4. Title 18 U.S.C.A. 242 (U.S. Criminal Code): "Whoever, under color of
law, statute, or ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any
inhabitants of any state to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or Law of the United
States. . . shall be fined no more than $1,000 or imprisoned one year or both."
5. Title 18 U.S.C.A. 241, 242 are the criminal equivalent of Title 42
U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985 et seq. "Judges have no immunity from prosecution for their
judicial acts." Bradley v. Fisher, U.S. 13 Wall.(1871)
6. "Federal Courts should avoid a ruling that any act of Congress is void
on its face if the act can be either construed as constitutional or applied as
constitutional." Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, F.Supp. 873 (U.S. District
Ct. of Montana -1977)
7. "When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of
his constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgment;
he acts no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice."
Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547 at 567 (1967)
8. "We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in
fact guilty of using his power to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other
personal motive not connected with the public good." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581.
9. "Government immunity violates the common law maxim that everyone shall
have remedy for an injury done to his person or property." Fireman's Ins. Co.
of Newark, N.J. v. Washburn County, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 (1957)
10. Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility, while liability
promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to
its people." Rabon v. Rowen Memorial Hosp., Inc. 269 NSI. 13, 152 S.E.2d 485,
"Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in
excess of authority can be actions under 'color of law'. " Stringer v. Dilger,
313 F.2d 536 (U.S. Ct. App 10th Circ. - 1963
11. "A judge is not immune from criminal sanctions under the civil rights
act." Ex Parte Virginia, 100 339 (1879)
12. "State officials acting in their official capacities, even if in abuse
of their lawful authority , generally are held to act "under color" of law.
This is because such officials are " clothed with the authority" of state law,
which gives them power to perpetrate the very wrongs that Congress intended
Section to prevent. " Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347
"The language and purpose of the civil rights acts, are inconsistent with
the application of common law notions of official immunity. . . " Jacobsen v.
Henne, 335 F.2d 129, 133 (U.S. Ct. App. 2nd Circ. - 1966) Also see" Anderson v.
Nosser, 428 F.2d 183 (U.S. Ct. App. 5th Circ. - 1971)
13. "Governmental immunity is not a defense under (42 USC 1983) making
liable every person who under color of state law deprives another person of his
civil rights." Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F.Supp. 95 (District Ct.- of Maine -
1970 "Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of
jurisdiction." Bradley v. Fisher, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)
14. As long as a defendant who abridges a plaintiff's constitutional rights
acts pursuant to a statute of local law which empowers him to commit the
wrongful act, an action under the Federal Civil Rights statute is established.
42 U.S.C.A. 1981 et seq.; Laverne v. Corning, 316 F.Supp. 629
15. "The Supreme Court initially discussed judicial immunity in Randall v.
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). In Randall, the Court wrote
that judges of superior or general jurisdiction courts were not liable to civil
actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts, where the acts, in excess
of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly."
16. [Plaintiffs Note that in more recent cases: Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978) and Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 it was found that judges were
really not acting in a malicious and corrupt manner and the proofs also showed
that. Congress, by its words and meaning, enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871
and that meaning included judges to be held responsible to an injured plaintiff
for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any judge making a case finding
to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional and unlawful. No Court
has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and
therefore said Congressional enacted legislation stands as law. The only way to
change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No judge can change it and
any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in Federal Courts as lawful.
No changes in the wording have ever been made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1985,
1986 and 1988 and therefore these Congressional enacted laws are enforceable in
the Federal Courts. The only change made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 took place
in 1979. At this time the words "or the District of Columbia" were inserted
following "Territory". If any judges or persons representing judges had wanted
to make a change this would have been an opportune time to do so. No action was
ever taken to change the wording of the law and it remains as such today.]
17. "The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance
between the evils inevitable in any available alternative. In situations of
abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for
vindication of constitutional guarantees." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 506, 98
S.Ct. 2910 (1978)
18. [Plaintiffs Note that Federal lawsuits can be brought under both Title
42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985, 1986, and/or brought directly under the Constitution
against federal officials. Butz at 504 "Referring both to the objective and
subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity (Plaintiffs' Note: or
"good faith") would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury. . ." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 at 2737, 457
19. "I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today,
imposing liability when a public-official defendant "knew or should have known"
of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. This standard would
not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to
escape liability for his actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been
expected" to know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and unusually
well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment
for his crimes. I also agree that this standard applies "across the board," to
all "government officials performing discretionary functions.," Harlow at 2739,
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmum concurring.
20. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting: "I do
not think that all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous
their conduct are immune from suit under 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
The Court's ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and
independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common-law doctrine of judicial
immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions." at 558-559
21. "The position that Congress did not intend to change the common-law
rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every member of Congress who
spoke to the issue assumed that the words of the statute meant what they said
and that judges would be liable." at 561
22. "Yet despite the repeated fears of its opponents, and the explicit
recognition that the section would subject judges to suit, the section remained
as it was proposed; it applied to "any person". There was no exception for
members of the judiciary. In light of the sharply contested nature of the issue
of judicial immunity it would be reasonable to assume that the judiciary would
have been expressly exempted from the wide sweep of the section, if Congress
had intended such a result." at 563
23. "We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in
fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any
other personal motive not connected with the public good." at 564
24. ". . .the judge who knowingly turns a trial into a "Kangaroo" court? Or
one who intentionally flouts the Constitution in order to obtain conviction?
Congress, I think, concluded that the evils of allowing intentional, knowing
deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far out weighed the speculative
inhibiting effects which might attend an inquiry into a judicial deprivation of
civil rights." at 567
25. "Judges are not immune for their nonjudicial activities, i.e.,
activities which are ministerial or administrative in nature." Santiago v. City
of Philadelphia, 435 F.Supp. 136
26. "It is not a judicial function for judge to commit intentional tort,
even though tort occurs in courthouse." Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates,
Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757
27. "There was no judicial immunity to civil actions for equitable relief
under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 1983 Shore v. Howard. 414 F.Supp.
28. There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability". Id.
29. "Repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their
constitutional and statutory rights is serious judicial misconduct." Matter of
Peeves, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 463.
30. "When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction or acts in face of
clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction,
judicial immunity is lost." Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844.
31. It is well established that a question of immunity to suit under 42
U.S.C. ï¿½ 1983 et seq. raises an issue of federal law and that state law
cannot immunize conduct of state actors which may otherwise violate
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held in Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 227. 284 n.8 (1980) that "Conduct by persons acting under color of state
law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. ï¿½ 1985 cannot be immunized by state
32. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity
defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an
illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that
proper construction may be enforced. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287,
290 (7th Cir. 1968) "The immunity claim raises a question of federal law."
[Plaintiffs Note that if the Right to Counsel under the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the Court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed, particularly in
child support contempt proceedings and false domestic violence proceedings.]
33. "Judges are not absolutely immune from liability to damages under Civil
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 & 1985 Peterson v Stanczak, 48 F.R.D.
34. "Under the common law of England, where individual rights were
preserved by a fundamental document such as the Magna Carta, violations of
those rights generally could be remedied by a traditional action for damages;
violation of constitutional right was viewed as a trespass, giving rise to a
trespass action. Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Center, 479 a.2d. 921
35. "There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability." Shore v.
Howard, 414 F.Supp. 379
36. "State judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect
and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights." Goss v.
State of Illinois, 312 F2d. 1279 (U.S.Ct.App. - Illinois - 1963)
37. "Conduct of trial judge must be measured by standard of fairness and
impartiality." Greener v. Green, 460 F.2d 1279 (U.S.Ct. App. - Pa. - 1972)
38. "Judge must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with
particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and
impartiality." 28 U.S.C.A. 144 Pfizer Inc. Lord F.2d 532, cert. denied 92 S.Ct.
2411, 406 U.S. 976 ( U.S. Ct. app - Minn. - 1972)
39. "... when a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face
of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction,
judicial immunity is lost." Id. [Plaintiffs Note that it is well settled that
non-custodial fathers as well as mothers have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in their parent/child relationship and case law as well as
statutory law has time and again upheld that right. Judges have complete
knowledge of the right of children to have access to both parents during
separation and after divorce. For a judge to discriminate on the basis of sex
to deny the parent/child relationship or severely limit it without just
cause/clear and convincing evidence, causes that judge to lose jurisdiction and
therefore judicial immunity because of his discriminatory "ministerial"
40. "Law requires not only impartial tribunal, but that that tribunal
appears to be impartial." 28 U.S.C.A. 455. In Re Tip-PaHands Enterprises, Inc.,
27 B.R. 780 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.)
41. "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on
the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409;
96 S.Ct. 984 (1976)
42. "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way
as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of
attainder prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Brown. 381 U.S.
303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946)
43. Alexander Hamilton wrote: "Nothing is more common than for a free
people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by
letting into the government principles and precedents which afterwards prove
fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disqualification,
disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The dangerous
consequences of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disfranchise
any number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions. "The Constitution
outlaws this entire category of punitive measures. The amount of punishment is
material to the classification of a challenged statute. But punishment is
prerequisite. . ." v. Lovett, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1083 (1946)
44. "The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, the circumstances
attending and the causes of the deprivation determining the fact. " U.S. v.
Lovett, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1083, (1946)